The strange (hi)story of particles and waves by Zeh, H. Dieter
	 1	
The strange (hi)story of particles and waves* 
H. Dieter Zeh – www.zeh-hd.de – arxiv:1304.1003v23    
 
Abstract: This is a non-technical presentation (in historical context) of the quantum theory 
that is strictly based on global unitarity. While the first part is written for a general readership, 
Sect. 5 may appear a bit provocative. I argue that the single-particle wave functions of quan-
tum mechanics have to be correctly interpreted as field modes that are “occupied once” (that 
is, first excited states of the corresponding quantum oscillators in the case of boson fields). 
Multiple excitations lead non-relativistically to apparent many-particle wave functions, while 
the quantum states proper are always defined by wave function(al)s on the configuration 
space of fundamental fields, or on another, as yet elusive, fundamental local basis. 
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Overview: Sects. 1 and 2 are a brief review of the early history - neglecting details. Sects. 3 
and 4 concentrate on some important properties of non-relativistic quantum mechanics that 
are often insufficiently pointed out in textbooks (including quite recent ones). Sect. 5 de-
scribes how this formalism would have to be generalized into its relativistic form (QFT), al-
though this program generally fails in practice for interacting fields because of the complicat-
ed entanglement that would arise between too many degrees of freedom. This may explain 
why QFT is mostly used in a semi-phenomenological manner that is often misunderstood as a 
fundamentally new theory. Sect. 6 describes the application of this Schrödinger picture to 
quantum gravity and quantum cosmology, while Sect. 7 concludes the paper. 																																																								*	Free and extended translation of my unpublished German text “Die sonderbare Geschichte von Teilchen und 
Wellen” – available at my website since October 2011. By the term “(hi)story” I tried to catch the double-
meaning of the German word “Geschichte”. V15 has now been published in Z. Naturf. A, 71, 195 (2016).  
– Depending on your interests, you may prefer to skip the first one or two (historical) sections!  
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1. Early History 
The conceptual distinction between a discrete or a continuous structure of matter (and perhaps 
other “substances”) goes back at least to the pre-Socratic philosophers. However, their con-
cepts and early ideas were qualitative and speculative. They remained restricted to some gen-
eral properties, such as symmetries, while the quantitative understanding of continuous matter 
and motion had to await the conceptual development of calculus on the one hand, and the 
availability of appropriate clocks on the other. Quantitative laws of nature and the concept of 
mass points, for example, were invented as part of classical mechanics.  
 This theory was first applied to extended “clumps of matter”, such as the heavenly 
bodies or falling rocks and apples. It was in fact a great surprise for Newton and his contem-
poraries (about 1680) that such very different objects – or, more precisely, their centers of 
mass – obeyed the same laws of motion.1 The objects themselves seemed to consist of contin-
uous matter, although the formal concept of mass points was quite early also applied to the 
structure of matter, that is, in the sense of an atomism. Already in 1738, Daniel Bernoulli ex-
plained the pressure of a gas by the mean kinetic energy of presumed particles, but without 
recognizing its relation to the phenomenon of heat. If one regarded these particles themselves 
as small elastic spheres, however, the question for their internal structure would in principle 
arise anew. The concept of elementary particles thus appears problematic from the outset.  
 At about the same time, Newton’s theory was also generalized by means of the con-
cept of a continuum of infinitesimal mass points which can move according to their local in-
teraction with (mainly their repulsion by) their direct neighbors. This route to continuum me-
chanics required novel mathematical concepts, but no fundamentally new physical ones be-
yond Newton. The assumption of an unlimited divisibility of matter thus led to a consistent 
theory. In particular, it allowed for wave-like propagating density oscillations, required to de-
scribe the phenomenon of sound. So it seemed that the fundamental question for the concep-
tual structure of matter had been answered.  
 As a byproduct of this “substantial” (or “Laplacean”) picture of continuum mechanics, 
based on the assumption of distinguishable and individually moving infinitesimal elements of 
matter, also the elegant “local” (or “Eulerian”) picture could be formulated. In the latter, one 
neglects any reference to trajectories of individual elements in order to consider only its spa-
tial density distribution together with a corresponding current density as the kinematical ob-
jects of interest. In modern language they may be called a scalar and a vector field. In spite of 
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this new form, however, continuum mechanics remained based on the concept of a locally 
conserved material substance consisting of individual elements.  
 This model for a continuum of mass points would be incomplete if the latter could 
move freely, interrupted only by occasional collisions, as suspected for a gas by Daniel Ber-
noulli. Since his gas pressure (which allows for sound waves, too) is given by the density of 
molecular kinetic energy, that is, by the product of the number density of gas particles and 
their mean kinetic energy, this could still be understood as representing a “chaotic continuum” 
by means of an appropriately defined simultaneous limit of infinite particle number density 
and vanishing particle size. This remained a possibility even when chemists began to succeed 
in applying Dalton’s and Avogadro’s hypotheses about molecular structures from the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century in order to understand the chemical properties of the various 
substances. Similar to Auguste Bravais’s concept of crystal lattices (about 1849), these struc-
tures were often regarded as no more than a heuristic tool to describe the internal structure of 
a multi-component continuum. This view was upheld by many even after Maxwell’s and 
Boltzmann’s explanation of thermodynamic phenomena in terms of molecular kinetics, and in 
spite of repeated but until then unsuccessful attempts to determine a finite value for Avoga-
dro’s or Loschmidt’s numbers. The “energeticists”, such as Wilhelm Ostwald, Ernst Mach 
and initially also Max Planck remained convinced until about 1900 that atoms are an illusion, 
while concepts like internal energy, heat and entropy would describe fundamental continua 
(fields). Indeed, even after the determination of Loschmidt’s number could they have used an 
argument that formed a severe problem for atomists: Gibbs’ paradox of the missing entropy of 
self-mixing of a gas. Today it is usually countered by referring to the indistinguishability of 
molecules of the same kind, although the argument requires more, namely the identity of 
states resulting from their permutations. Such an identity would be in conflict with the con-
cept of particles with their individual trajectories, while a field with two bumps at points x and 
y would by definition be the same as one with bumps at y and x Although we are using quite 
novel theories today, such conceptual subtleties do remain essential – see Sect. 5. (Their role 
in statistical thermodynamics depends also on dynamical arguments.)  
 Another object affected by the early dispute about particles and waves is light. Ac-
cording to its potential of being absorbed and emitted, light was traditionally regarded as a 
“medium” rather than a substance. Nonetheless, and in spite of Huygens’ early ideas of light 
as a wave phenomenon in analogy to sound, Newton tried to explain it by means of “particles 
of light”, which were supposed to move along trajectories according to the local refractive 
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index of matter. This proposal was later refuted by various interference experiments, in par-
ticular those of Thomas Young in 1802. It remained open, though, what substance (called the 
ether) did oscillate in space and time – even after light had been demonstrated by Heinrich 
Hertz in 1886 to represent an electromagnetic phenomenon in accordance with Maxwell’s 
equations. The possibility of these fields to propagate and carry energy gave them a certain 
substantial character that seemed to support the world of continua as envisioned by the ener-
geticists. Regarding atoms, Ernst Mach used to ask “Have you ever seen one?” whenever 
somebody mentioned them to him. Later in this article I will argue that his doubts may be jus-
tified even today – although we seem to observe individual atoms and particle tracks. Similar 
to the phenomenon of “events” or “quantum jumps”, they may be an illusion caused by the 
dynamics of Schrödinger’s wave function, which does not live in space (Sect. 3). 
 At the end of the nineteenth century, the continuum hypothesis suffered a number of 
decisive blows. In 1897, J. J. Thomson discovered the elementary electric charge; in 1900, 
Max Planck postulated his radiation quanta for the electromagnetic field with great success; 
and in 1905, Albert Einstein estimated the value of Loschmidt’s number NL by means of his 
theory of Brownian motion. Thereafter, even the last energeticists resigned, but they left some 
confusion about the concept of physical “states”. While they had regarded temperature, pres-
sure and internal energy density etc. as local degrees of freedom that characterize individual 
(ontic) states of matter, the latter were in atomic physics replaced by “thermodynamic states” 
that average over unknown particle properties, either in time, or in space (“coarse graining”), 
or with respect to some other incomplete knowledge. In quantum theory, this confusion sur-
vives in the operationalist definition of states or in the concept of “mixed states” (see Sect. 4).  
Einstein even revived the concept of particles of light (later called photons) – although 
he regarded it merely as a “heuristic point of view” that he was never ready to fully accept 
himself. For some time, Planck’s radiation quanta were indeed attributed to a discrete emis-
sion process rather than to the radiation itself. So in 1913, Niels Bohr replaced the concept of 
classical motion for atomic electrons by stochastic “jumps” between his discrete atomic orbits 
– in accordance with Planck’s and Einstein’s ideas about a probabilistic radiation process. 
These early ideas led later to the insufficient interpretation of quantum mechanics as no more 
than stochastic dynamics for otherwise classical particles.  
 However, the development soon began to proceed in the opposite direction again.2 In 
1923, Louis de Broglie inverted Einstein’s speculative step from light waves to photons by 
postulating a wave length λ = c/ν = h/p for the electron, where p is its momentum, in analogy 
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with Planck’s relation E = pc = hν. For him, this could only mean that all microscopic objects 
must consist of both, a particle and a wave, whereby the wave has to serve as a “guiding 
field” or “pilot wave” for the particle. This field would have to be more powerful than a con-
ventional force field, since it has to determine the velocity rather than merely the acceleration; 
the initial velocity can according to this proposal not be freely chosen any more once the 
wave function is given. When David Bohm later brought this theory into a consistent form, it 
turned out that the pilot wave cannot be defined in space (“locally”), since it has to be identi-
fied with the global entangled wave function to be described in Sect. 4. 
 
2. Wave Mechanics 
Inspired by de Broglie’s ideas, Schrödinger based his novel wave mechanics of 1926 on the 
assumption that electrons are solely and uniquely described by wave functions (spatial fields, 
as he first thought). His wave equation allowed him to explain the hydrogen spectrum by re-
placing Bohr’s specific electron orbits by standing waves. In this way he could explain the 
puzzling discrete quantum numbers by the numbers of nodes the wave function needs to obey 
its boundary conditions. For a special case (the harmonic oscillator) he was furthermore able 
to construct “wave packets” that may imitate moving particles – see Fig. 1 for the case of free 
motion, however. Shortly thereafter, interference phenomena in agreement with de Broglie’s 
wave length were observed by Davisson and Germer for electrons scattered from crystal lat-
tices. A wave function can furthermore penetrate a potential barrier and thus quantitatively 
explain “quantum tunneling” for the phenomenon of a-decay. Does this not very strongly in-
dicate that electrons and other “particles” are in reality just wave packets of fields that obey 
Schrödinger’s wave equation? 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Real part of a one-dimensional complex wave packet (the product of a Gaussian with a plane wave e2πix/λ) 
moving freely according to the time-dependent Schrödinger equation, depicted at three different times (blue: t=0, 
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red: t=0.04, yellow: t=1 in relative units). If the wave packet describes reality, its width defines a “real uncertain-
ty” for the object position; it does neither represent incomplete information, nor is it related to the measureable 
“particle” size (which has to be described by internal degrees of freedom – see Sect. 4). When comparing blue 
and red, one recognizes that the packet moves faster than its wave crests, while the yellow curve demonstrates a 
slight spreading of the packet (in contrast to the mentioned harmonic oscillator). The center of the packet moves 
according to the group velocity v = p/m := h/mλ, where the mass m is just a parameter of the wave equation. For 
this reason, momentum is in wave mechanics defined by the wave number h/l (not by motion!), although it is 
mostly observed by means of moving wave packets (moving “objects”). It can then be measured even for plane 
waves, which would not define a group velocity, by means of the conservation of wave numbers k = 2π/l during 
interactions with objects that do exist as wave packets, thus giving rise to the concept of “momentum transfer”. 
Already for atomic masses and thermal velocities, the de Broglie wave length is clearly smaller than the radius of 
a hydrogen atom, so one may construct quite narrow wave packets for their center of mass (cms) wave functions. 
While the dispersion of the wave packet decreases with increasing mass m, it becomes always non-negligible 
after a sufficient time interval. In order to compensate for it, one would need an additional dynamical mechanism 
that permanently reduces the “coherence length” characterizing a wave packet in order to retain the appearance 
of a particle (see for “collapse” or “decoherence” in Sect. 4).  
A few months before Schrödinger invented his wave mechanics, Heisenberg had al-
ready proposed his matrix mechanics. In contrast to Schrödinger, he did not abandon the con-
cept of particles, but in a romantic attempt to revive Platonic idealism and overcome a mech-
anistic world view, combined with an ingenious guess, he introduced an abstract formalism 
that was to replace the concept of deterministic trajectories by formal probabilistic rules. To-
gether with Born and Jordan, Heisenberg then constructed an elegant algebraic framework 
that could be used to “quantize” all mechanical systems. This mathematical abstraction per-
fectly matched Heisenberg’s idealistic philosophy. In particular, matrix mechanics was shown 
in principle to lead to the same predictions as wave mechanics – although it could be used in 
practice only in simple cases. A year after his first paper, Heisenberg supplemented his for-
malism by his uncertainty relations between position and momentum of an electron or other 
“conjugate” pairs of variables. Such a fundamental uncertainty is clearly in conflict with a 
consistent concept of particles, while in wave mechanics it is simply a consequence of the 
Fourier theorem – without any uncertainty of the wave function or the assumption of an un-
avoidable “distortion” of the state of the electron during a measurement (as originally sug-
gested by Heisenberg). Another indication of a choice of inappropriate concepts may be the 
requirement of a “new logic” for them. So it is not surprising that Schrödinger’s intuitive 
wave mechanics was preferred by most atomic physicists – for a short time even by Heisen-
berg’s mentor Max Born. For example, Arnold Sommerfeld wrote only a “Wellenmecha-
nischer Ergänzungsband” to his influential book “Atombau und Spektrallinien”.  
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Some important phenomena, though, remained in conflict with Schrödinger’s theory. 
While his general wave equation ih∂y/∂t = Hy would allow various time-dependent solu-
tions, such as the moving wave packet of Fig. 1, bound electrons appeared to be restricted to 
standing waves. The latter are solutions of the stationary Schrödinger equation Hy = Ey that 
gives rise to the observed discrete eigenvalues En under the required boundary conditions. 
Although this equation can be derived from the general one under the assumption of a special 
time dependence of the form y µ eiEt/h, there is no general reason for this special form. Instead 
of obeying the time-dependent equations when interacting with electromagnetic fields, these 
bound states seemed to be ruled by Bohr’s stochastic “quantum jumps”, which would thus 
explain energy quanta of radiation (including the hydrogen spectrum) by means of the con-
servation of energy. Other wave functions seem to “jump” or “collapse” into particle-like nar-
row wave packets during position measurements. In a Wilson chamber, one could even ob-
serve tracks of droplets that can be regarded as successions of such position measurements 
along particle trajectories.  
As a consequence, Schrödinger seemed to resign when Max Born, influenced by 
Wolfgang Pauli, re-interpreted his new probability postulate, which originally was to describe 
jumps between different wave functions, in terms of probabilities for the spontaneous crea-
tion of particle properties (such as positions or momenta). This interpretation turned out to be 
very successful (and earned Born a Nobel prize) even though it was never quite honest, since 
the wave function does not only describe probabilities. It is also required to represent individ-
ual observable properties, such as energy or angular momentum, by means of corresponding 
“eigenstates”, whose structure can often be confirmed by appropriate experiments. Similarly, 
a spinor (a generalized wave function for the electron spin) describes probabilities for other 
individual spinor states rather than for classical properties.  
The impossibility to derive the successful wave function from his uncertainty principle 
(while the reverse is possible) was so painful for Heisenberg that he regarded the former as “a 
new form of human knowledge as an intermediary level of reality”, while Bohr introduced 
his, in his own words, “irrational” principle of complementarity. It required the application of 
mutually exclusive (“complementary”) classical concepts, such as particles and waves, to the 
same objects. No doubt – this was an ingenious pragmatic strategy to avoid many problems, 
but, from there on, the search for a unique description of Nature was not allowed any more in 
microscopic physics. Pure Gedanken-experiments, traditionally used as consistency tests for 
physical concepts, were now discredited for being “counterfactual”. As an answer to the ques-
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tion whether the electron be really a wave or a particle (or what else), Bohr insisted that 
“there is no microscopic reality” – a conclusion that was often regarded as philosophically 
very deep. Only few dared to object that “this emperor is naked”, while the term “complemen-
tarity” might be no more than another name for a conceptual inconsistency – thus perhaps 
forming the greatest sophism in the history of science. (A related misconception is the recent-
ly invented “quantum information” about quantities that cannot really exist.) The large num-
ber of attempts of a philosophical or formal explanation of this “nonconcept” is even the more 
impressive. Furthermore, the question when and where precisely the probability interpretation 
(or the “Heisenberg cut” between quantum and classical concepts) has to be applied, that is, 
when a “virtual” property becomes “real”, remained open to be pragmatically decided from 
case to case. Therefore, the Hungarian Eugene Wigner spoke of a “Balkanization of physics” 
– a traditional (Hapsburgian) expression for the decay of law and order during that time.  
 
3. Wave Functions in Configuration Space 
So one should take a more complete look at Schrödinger’s wave mechanics. When he formu-
lated it, he used Hamilton’s partial differential equations as a guiding principle. These equa-
tions, the result of a reformulation of classical mechanics, are solved by a scalar function 
whose gradient describes a continuum of independent classical trajectories which differ by 
their initial conditions – sort of a wave function without interference. Hamilton had mainly 
been interested in the elegant mathematical form of this theory rather than in applications. 
This turned out to be an advantage for Schrödinger. He assumed that Hamilton’s equations 
were no more than a short wave lengths approximation (corresponding to the limit h ® 0) of a 
fundamental wave theory – similar to the approximation of geometric optics in Maxwell’s 
theory. However, this short wave length approximation only means that local parts of an ex-
tended wave propagate almost independently of one another along spatial paths – not that they 
represent particles. Similarly, Feynman’s path integral defines a propagating wave as a super-
position of the various causal chains contained in such a continuum,3 while it neither requires 
nor justifies the existence of individual paths that might then simply be selected by an in-
crease of information. Different partial waves or Feynman paths can in fact interfere with one 
another (that is, they may have coherent physical effects). This means that they exist together 
as one reality (one wave function) rather than merely defining a statistical ensemble of possi-
bilities. They could be turned into an ensemble only by some stochastic dynamics that would 
have partially to replace the deterministic wave equation. 
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 While light waves propagate in three-dimensional space, Hamilton’s waves must ac-
cording to their construction exist in the configuration space of all possible classical states q 
of the system under consideration. Therefore, Schrödinger, too, obtained wave functions on 
(what appears to us classically as) configuration spaces of various dimensions rather than in 
space. This is an enormous difference, that turned out to be very important for atoms and 
molecules. Intuitive spatial wave functions are here quite insufficient, in general. These 
“true” wave functions can also be understood as a consequence of Dirac’s fundamental super-
position principle, since the superposition of all classical configurations q defines precisely a 
wave function y(q) on configuration space. It can then easily be further generalized to include 
properties that never occur as classical variables (such as spin, neutrino flavor, or even the 
difference between a K-meson and its antiparticle), whose superpositions may again define 
new individual physical states (even new kinds of “particles”). Dirac himself understood his 
superpositions in Born’s pragmatic but enigmatic sense as “probability amplitudes” for prop-
erties that are formally represented by Heisenberg’s classically motivated “observables”. 
There is no absolutely preferred basis in Hilbert space, and probabilities are thus meaningful 
only with respect to corresponding “measurements”. If these observables are written in terms 
of dyadic products of their eigenstates (their spectral representation), they may formally de-
scribe Born’s probabilities as those for jumps of wave functions (stochastic projections in Hil-
bert space as part of the dynamics). Any proposal for some fundamental theory underlying 
quantum mechanics would first of all have to explain the very general and well established 
superposition principle, which, in particular, describes all phenomena of quantum nonlocality 
without any “spooky” action at a distance (see Sect. 4). There does not seem to be any way to 
derive this principle and its corresponding probability interpretation from some classical field 
theory with its merely spatial superposition principle – no matter how many dimensions.  
Schrödinger was still convinced of a reality in space and time, and so he tried, in spite 
of the Hamiltonian analogy, to understand the electron wave function as a spatial field (the 
“y-field”). Therefore, he first restricted himself with great success to single-particle problems 
(quantized mass points, whose configuration space is isomorphic to space). This approach 
misled not only himself for some time, but a whole generation of physicists. A spatial wave 
function can also be readily used to describe scattering problems – either in terms of the cen-
ter-of-mass wave function of an object scattered from a potential, or of the relative coordi-
nates of a two-body problem. In scattering events, Born’s probability interpretation is particu-
larly suggestive because of the usual subsequent position measurement in a detector. A wave 
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function in space is indeed usually meant when one speaks of the wave-particle dualism. In 
spite of its limited and often misleading role, three-dimensional wave mechanics still domi-
nates large parts of most textbooks because of its success in correctly and intuitively describ-
ing many important single-particle aspects, such as the energy spectrum of the hydrogen atom 
and scattering probabilities. It is often supported by presenting the two-slit experiment as the 
key to understand quantum mechanics, although this is only one specific aspect of the theory. 
The generalization (or rather the return) to wave functions in configuration space hap-
pened almost unnoticed at those times of great confusion – for some physicists even until to-
day. While most of them are now well aware of “quantum nonlocality”, they remain used to 
arguing in terms of spatial waves for many purposes. In contrast to classical fields, however, 
even single-particle wave functions do not describe additive (extensive) quantities, since a 
piece cut from a plane wave representing a quantum “particle”, for example, would describe 
its full charge and kinetic energy (the latter being defined by the wave number).  
 Schrödinger took initially great pains to disregard or to re-interpret his general wave 
equation in configuration space, even though it is precisely its application to oscillating field 
amplitudes instead of mass points that explains Planck’s radiation quanta hn. (Another early 
example is the rigid rotator, whose wave function depends on the three Euler angles.) The 
reason is that the spectrum E = nhn for quantum oscillators qi (here the amplitudes of given 
field modes that classically oscillate in time with different frequencies ni rather than positions 
of mechanical oscillators) is proportional to the natural numbers n. Only this specific spectral 
property describes additive energy quanta hn regardless of any emission process that had of-
ten been made responsible for the quantization of radiation. So it also explains the concept of 
“occupation numbers” for the field modes (or “photon” numbers). In Schrödinger’s wave me-
chanics, these quantum numbers n are explained by the number of nodes of the oscillator 
wave functions. These have to be distinguished from the spatial nodes of the field modes 
themselves (such as sin(kix) multiplied by a polarization vector). These field modes (rather 
than their wave functions) then appear as “photon wave functions” – see below and Sect. 5. 
But where can one find these oscillator wave functions if not in space? In contrast to 
Fig. 1, they are here defined as functions on the abstract configuration space of the field am-
plitude qi. Different eigenmodes of a classical field q(x,t), such as plane waves with their 
classical wave numbers ki = 2πni/c, can fortunately be quantized separately; their Hamiltoni-
ans commute. This means that energy eigenstates Y for the total quantum field factorize in the 
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form Y=Piyi(qi), while their eigenvalues simply add, E = SiEi. Although the oscillator spec-
trum Ei = nihni can also be derived from Heisenberg’s algebra of observables (matrix mechan-
ics) without explicitly using wave functions, the latter’s nodes for a fixed field mode qi have 
recently been made visible for various “photon number” eigenstates (similar to different ener-
gy eigenfunctions of the electron in the hydrogen atom) in an elegant experiment.4 The wave 
functions yi(qi) on configuration space have thus been demonstrated to “exist”, although they 
cannot be attributed to the traditional wave-particle dualism, which would refer to spatial 
waves characterizing “quantum particles”. The importance of this fundamental experiment for 
the wave-particle debate has in my opinion not yet been appropriately appreciated by the 
physics community or in textbooks (see Sect. 5 for further details).  
 The difference between Schrödinger’s theory and a classical field theory becomes par-
ticularly obvious from the fact that the amplitudes of a classical field now appear as argu-
ments q in Schrödinger’s wave function. Positions occur here only as an “index” that distin-
guishes field amplitudes at different space points, where they form a spatial continuum of 
coupled oscillators. Since classical fields are usually written as functions on space and time, 
q(x,t), the confusion of their spatial arguments with particle positions in the single-particle 
wave function y(x,t) led to the questionable concept of a “time operator” in an attempt to re-
store space-time symmetry. However, x and t in the field q are both classical coordinates, 
while the particle position x in y defines dynamical degrees of freedom (still called “varia-
bles” although they now appear only as arguments of the time-dependent wave function).  
While a general time-dependent “one-photon wave function” can be understood as a 
quantum superposition of different modes of the electromagnetic field (its Fourier representa-
tion) that are in their first excited quantum state (“occupied once” – with all others in their 
ground state), a quasi-classical field state has in QFT to be described as a coherent superposi-
tion of many different excitations yi(n)(qi,t) (different “photon numbers” n) for each spatial 
eigenmode i. In contrast to the free wave packet shown in Fig. 1, these “coherent oscillator 
states” (time-dependent Gaussians, now functions of the field amplitude) preserve their shape 
and width exactly, while their centers follow classical trajectories qi(t). Therefore, they imitate 
oscillating classical fields much better than wave packets in space may imitate particles.  
One and the same quantum concept of field functionals Y may thus consistently repre-
sent “complementary” classical concepts such as “particle” numbers and field amplitudes – 
albeit again mutually restricted by a Fourier theorem. For this reason, the Boltzmann distribu-
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tion e-E/kT of their energy eigenstates may describe the Planck spectrum with its particle and 
wave limits for short and long wavelengths, respectively. Field functionals can also describe 
all specific phenomena of quantum optics, such as “photon bunching”. 
 
4. Entanglement and Quantum Measurements 
Before trying to study interacting quantum fields (Sect. 5), early quantum physicists success-
fully investigated the quantum mechanics of non-relativistic “many-particle” systems, such as 
multi-electron atoms, molecules and solid bodies. These systems could often approximately 
be described by means of different (orthogonal) single-particle wave functions for each elec-
tron, while the atomic nuclei seemed to possess fixed or slowly moving positions, similar to 
classical objects. For example, this picture explained the periodic system of the chemical ele-
ments. On closer inspection it turned out, however, – at first for the ground and excited states 
of atoms and small molecules – that all N particles forming such objects, including the nuclei, 
have indeed to be described by one common wave function in their 3N-dimensional configu-
ration space. This cannot normally be a product or determinant of single-particle wave func-
tions – a consequence that was later called “entanglement”. It must similarly apply to differ-
ent wave modes qi of interacting fields in QFT. Given any two systems, the set of all their 
separating (non-entangled) quantum states can only have measure zero. When David Bohm 
began to study consequences of this fundamental property for his theory of 1952, he referred 
to it as “quantum wholeness”, since entanglement means that quantum theory can only be 
consistently understood as quantum cosmology (see Sect. 6). Historically, the essential role of 
this generic entanglement was often belittled as a mere statistical correlation between subsys-
tems, while this misinterpretation was then incorrectly used in turn as an argument against an 
ontic interpretation of the wave function. The presently very popular toy model of entangled 
qubits, interrupted by classically described actions of Alice and Bob, is but an inconsistent 
caricature of quantum mechanics. 
Every physics student is using the entanglement between an electron and a proton in 
the hydrogen atom when writing the wave function as a product of functions for center-of-
mass and relative coordinates. This would not make sense for interacting fields, which are 
always separately defined.  While the wave function for the relative coordinates then defines 
the size and structure of the hydrogen atom, the center of mass may be represented by a free 
spatial wave packet as in Fig. 1. The simplest nontrivial case of entanglement, the Helium 
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atom, was first successfully studied in great numerical detail by Hylleraas, using variational 
methods, in a series of papers starting in 1929. Already Arnold Sommerfeld noticed in his 
Wellenmechanischer Ergänzungsband that “Heisenberg’s method”, which used only the anti-
symmetrization of product wave functions by means of “exchange terms”, is insufficient to 
correctly describe multi-particle systems. (Anti-) symmetrisation is often confused with en-
tanglement, since it formally describes entanglement between physical variables and mean-
ingless particle numbers, that merely eliminates any concept of distinguishability.† It is there-
fore not required any more in the occupation number representation of QFT (see Sect. 5). For 
long-range interactions, entanglement may be small in low-energy states, since it corresponds 
to “virtual excitations” of single-particle states (which are often misinterpreted as “fluctua-
tions” rather than static entanglement).  
An important consequence of entanglement is that subsystem Hamiltonians may be 
not (or not uniquely) defined – thus excluding local unitarity and a uniquely defined Heisen-
berg or interaction picture for open systems. Closed non-relativistic N-particle systems, on the 
other hand, have to be described by one common wave function in their complete configura-
tion space. Their center-of-mass motion may then factorize from the rest, thus leading to a 
spatial wave function for it (identical to that for mass points or “quantum particles”), while 
the internal energy quantum numbers of such systems are given by the numbers of nodes 
(now forming hypersurfaces) in the remaining 3(N-1)-dimensional configuration space. For 
non-inertial motion, this separation holds only approximately.5 Although approximately 
closed systems represent an exception, they were the main objects being studied for simplicity 
while quantum theory was being developed. Open system quantum mechanics was invented 
much later – mostly in combination with statistical physics. Time-dependent Hamiltonians are 
a relic of classical physics, too, as they would require time-dependent separating states as a 
source of the time-dependent forces (thus neglecting entanglement). When unitary dynamics 
was consistently applied to a global system in order to derive subsystem quantum dynamics, 
it led to local non-unitarity, and in particular to the concept of decoherence.  
 However, how can the space of all possible classical configurations, which would even 
possess varying dimensions, in this way replace three-dimensional space as the fundamental 																																																								†	Separate (anti-)symmetrization of spin and orbit parts, however, may define physical entanglement between 
particles. Genuine entanglement in many-electron atoms would mean, for example, that one has to take into ac-
count “configuration mixing” in jj-coupling as a correction to the independent-particle (Hartree-Fock or mean 
field) approximation. Therefore, the statement “particle at position x1” (in contrast to “particle number 1”) “has 
spin-up” – as in a Bell type experiment – is physically meaningful.	
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arena for the dynamics of physical states? If our Universe consisted of N particles (and noth-
ing else), its configuration space would possess 3N dimensions – with N being at least of or-
der 1080. For early quantum physicists – including Schrödinger, of course – such a wave func-
tion was inconceivable, although the concept of a space of possible configurations fits excel-
lently with Born’s probabilities for classical properties. Entanglement can then conveniently 
be understood as describing statistical correlations between measured variables. But only be-
tween measured variables! Since macroscopic variables are “permanently measured” by their 
environment (see below for decoherence), their entanglement almost always appears as no 
more than a statistical correlation. This explains why we are used to interpret the space on 
which the wave function is defined as a “configuration” space, even though entanglement is 
responsible, for example, for the precise energy spectrum and other individual properties of 
bound microscopic systems – regardless of any statistical interpretation. This conceptual dif-
ference is often “overlooked” for convenience in order to keep up the illusion of an epistemic 
interpretation of the wave function (where probabilities would reflect incomplete information 
about “hidden” variables). Even after individual scattering events one often needs entangled 
scattering amplitudes with well-defined phase relations between all fragments, while mere 
scattering probabilities would be insufficient to describe the situation. But only after Einstein, 
Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) had shown in 1935 that the entanglement between two particles at 
a distance may have directly observable consequences, did Schrödinger regard this property 
as the greatest challenge to his theory – although he kept calling it a “statistical correlation”. 
EPR had indeed erroneously concluded from their analysis that quantum mechanics cannot 
represent a complete description of Nature, so that hidden variables had to be expected.   
 While many physicists speculated that such hypothetical hidden variables could possi-
bly never be observed (even though they might exist), it came as a surprise to them when John 
Bell showed in 1964 that any kind of hidden local reality (no matter whether it consists of 
particles, fields or other local things with local interactions only – observable or not) would be 
in conflict with certain observable consequences of entangled wave functions. This conclu-
sion eliminated the most important argument for an epistemic interpretation of the wave func-
tion (namely, the possibility of a statistical explanation of its suspicious non-locality). In order 
to prove his theorem, Bell used arbitrary local variables l (just a name for something not yet 
known) for an indirect proof, but most physicists had by then become so much accustomed to 
Bohr’s rejection of microscopic reality that they immediately accused Bell for having used a 
“long refuted assumption”. However, Bohr had been led to his radical denial of microscopic 
reality only because of his insistence on classical concepts (such as particles), and since Hei-
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senberg’s original justification of his uncertainty principle by means of unavoidable perturba-
tions of conjugate variables during measurements had turned out to be insufficient. Bohr’s 
philosophical position should therefore not be used as an argument against an ontic interpreta-
tion of the nonlocal wave function. No logic can exclude the possibility that apparent points in 
configuration space (classical “states”) are in reality narrow wave packets.  
Crucial direct tests of Bell’s consequence of quantum nonlocality had in practice to be 
restricted to two- or few-particle systems, which can be isolated from everything else until 
they are measured. While their entanglement, which is a direct consequence of the superposi-
tion principle, has thereby always been confirmed, physicists are still debating whether this 
fact excludes locality or any kind of “microscopic reality” (which may just mean the existence 
of a complete and consistent formal description). None of these two sides feels particularly 
bothered by Bell’s theorem. The two camps usually prefer the Schrödinger picture (in terms 
of wave functions) or the Heisenberg picture (in terms of observables), respectively, and this 
seems to be the origin of many misunderstandings between them. In the absence of any local 
states, dynamical locality (“relativistic causality”) may even appear difficult to define – but 
see the discussion in the third paragraph from the end of Sect. 5: QFT is dynamically local 
even in the relativistic sense.  
  If one does assume the superposition principle to apply universally, one is forced to 
accept one entangled wave function for the whole universe. Heisenberg and Bohr assumed 
instead that the wave function is no more than a calculational tool which “loses its meaning” 
after the final measurement that concludes an experiment. This “end of the experiment” (re-
lated to the “Heisenberg cut”) remains vaguely defined and ad hoc. Its traditional application 
(namely, too early in the chain of interactions that leads to an observation) had indeed delayed 
the discovery of decoherence, which will be discussed below, for several decades. When I 
first suggested its importance, I was regularly told by colleages that quantum theory does not 
apply to the environment. A universal wave function that always evolves according to the 
Schrödinger equation, however, leads to an entirely novel world view that, in spite of being 
entirely consistent, still appears inacceptable to many physicists.  
For example, if one measures a microscopic object that is initially in a superposition of 
two or more different values of the measured variable, this gives rise to an entangled state for 
the microscopic system and the apparatus – the latter including Schrödinger’s infamous cat if 
correspondingly prepared. (All unitary interactions discussed here and below may be assumed 
to be of a form like (åncnyn)F0®åncnynFn, that is, transforming local superpositions into en-
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tanglement – thus in the “ideal” case without changing or “disturbing” the measured states 
yn.) Since superpositions of different pointer positions have never been observed, one tradi-
tionally (but perhaps unnecessarily) postulates according to von Neumann that Schrödinger’s 
dynamics has to be complemented by a stochastic “collapse of the wave function” into one of 
its components, or into a product of narrow wave packets for all macroscopic variables. How-
ever, in a unitary description there is no distinction between measurements and general inter-
actions. Heisenberg’s “observables” are then readily defined (up to a scale) by the interaction 
Hamiltonian between system and apparatus rather than forming an independent ingredient of 
the theory. Since this interaction characterizes a measurement device regardless of the time of 
its application, it appears quite unreasonable to endow it with the actual dynamics of the ob-
ject (as done in the Heisenberg picture). In the Copenhagen interpretation, one would prag-
matically jump from a description in terms of wave functions to one in classical terms, and 
back to a new wave function in order to describe a subsequent experiment. This unsatisfactory 
situation is known as the quantum measurement problem.  
 If one is ready, instead, to accept a universal Schrödinger equation to describe reality, 
one has to understand what an entangled wave function for the microscopic system plus an 
apparatus would mean. To do so, one has to include the observer into the quantum descrip-
tion.6 When he reads off the measurement result, he becomes himself part of the entangle-
ment. According to the unitary dynamics, he would thereafter simultaneously exist in differ-
ent states of awareness (different states of mind) – similar to the fate of Schrödinger’s cat. 
Hugh Everett first dared to point out in 1957 that this consequence is not in conflict with our 
subjective observation of one individual outcome, since each arising “component state” (or 
“version”) of the observer can register and remember (hence be aware of) only that outcome 
which is realized in his corresponding “relative state” of the world. This partial state would 
also contain only compatible versions of all the observer’s “friends” – thus defining objecti-
vized outcomes. As there are many such correlated component states (with their many minds) 
in one global superposition, though, the question which of them contains the physicist who 
prepared the experiment has no unique answer; according to the unitary dynamics they all do.  
Why can these components be regarded as separate “worlds” with separate observer 
states? The answer is that they are dynamically “autonomous” after an irreversible measure-
ment in spite of their common origin; each of them describes a quasi-classical world for its 
macroscopic variables (see the discussion of decoherence below). In contrast to identical 
twins, who also have one common causal origin, different versions of the “same” observer in 
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autonomous branches cannot even communicate according to the unitary dynamics, and thus 
can conclude each other’s existence only by means of an extrapolation of the dynamical laws 
that they happen to know. This is certainly an unconventional, but at least a consistent picture, 
since it is a straightforward consequence of the Schrödinger equation; it only requires the 
recognition and identification of some semi-autonomous physical “systems”, whose definition 
is consistent with a global nonlocal wave function under local interactions, with subjective 
observers. Attempts to avoid this conclusion are all motivated by traditional prejudice, and 
would lead back to an unsolved measurement problem.  
 Many physicists still prefer to believe, instead, that some conceptual or dynamical 
border line between micro- and macrophysics must exist – even though it could never be lo-
cated in an experiment. Otherwise it should be possible (so it seemed) to observe individual 
consequences of entanglement between microscopic systems and their macroscopic meas-
urement instruments – similar to the energy or other properties of Hylleraas’s entangled Heli-
um atom or of small molecules. However, this bipartite entanglement is not yet complete. 
Macroscopic systems must inevitably and extremely fast interact with their natural “environ-
ment”, whereby the entanglement that had resulted from the measurement proper would un-
controllably and irreversibly spread into much of the “rest of the universe”. This happens 
even before an observer possibly enters the scene. In this way, one may understand how a 
superposition that extends over different macroscopic pointer positions, for example, would, 
from the point of view of a potential local observer, inevitably be transformed into an appar-
ent ensemble of narrow wave packets that mimic classical states (points in configuration 
space) as potential outcomes. Although still forming one superposition, these partial waves, 
which may include different states of all observers, have no chance to meet again in high-
dimensional configuration space in order to have local coherent consequences. In this sense 
(only), they can now be regarded as forming an ensemble of different “worlds”.  
This unavoidable entanglement with the environment (whose onset defines the true 
border line between micro- and macrophysics) is called decoherence,7 as predominantly phase 
relations defining certain quantum mechanical superpositions become locally unavailable: 
they are irreversibly “dislocalized”.‡ As Erich Joos and I once formulated it, the superposition 																																																								‡	A mere phase randomization (“dephasing”) could neither occur under unitary dynamics, nor would it solve the 
issue, as each individual member of an ensemble of superpositions with different phases would remain a super-
position (though possibly with unknown phase). Similarly, local phases that are assumed to fluctuate rapidly in 
time for some reason are in a definite superposition at any instant. Nonetheless, phase averaging forms the most 
popular misunderstanding of decoherence, which describes entanglement with the environment in the individual 
case (no averaging). These different concepts are easily confused, in particular, if the environment is described 
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still exists, but it “is not there” (somewhere) any more. Decoherence is in general a very dras-
tic consequence of quantum dynamics, which requires (and allows) precise numerical calcula-
tions only for some mesoscopic systems, such as chiral molecules.8 For example, some of the 
latter are found in chiral states on Earth, but in parity eigenstates in interstellar space, where 
interaction with the environment is weaker. In contrast, all objects that can be “seen” under 
normal conditions must permanently scatter light, which is thus entangled with the state of the 
object. If two positions can be distinguished by “just looking”, the quantum states of their 
scattered light must be orthogonal, and thus decohere the object. The position basis is here 
“preferred” by the locality of interactions.  
The time asymmetry of the decoherence process (in causing uncontrollable entangle-
ment) can be explained by means of a low entropy initial condition for the global wave func-
tion.9 However, without the other non-trivial consequence of global unitarity, namely the con-
cept of splitting observers (“many minds”), decoherence would not be able to explain the ob-
servation of individual measurement outcomes. Decoherence thus represents only half of the 
measurement story, while Everett without decoherence would be ambiguously defined. Deco-
herence has therefore occasionally been questioned even to contribute the quantum measure-
ment problem, but the subsequent splitting of observer states amounts for the latter to what 
Pauli once called the “creation of measurement results outside the laws of Nature”; it is now 
described as a dynamical consequence of global unitary dynamics on the observer himself. 
Instead of properly taking into account the environment and the role of the observer in a con-
sistent quantum setting, that is, in a deeply entangled world, Pauli, Heisenberg and their disci-
ples had to refer to an extra-physical observer or his “information” (a concept of questionable 
popularity) as a deus ex machina. 
																																																																																																																																																																													
as a “thermal bath”. However, if this initial thermal “mixture” had been caused by earlier quantum interactions 
with the environment (which is its most realistic origin in a quantum world), the thus pre-existing entanglement 
would simply be dynamically extended to the “dephased” variables, where it would then also lead to their genu-
ine decoherence (a dislocalization of their individual relative phases). Using the reduced density matrix formal-
ism would tacitly replace nonlocal entanglement by local ensembles: entanglement is insufficiently defined for 
“mixed states”. It is remarkable that many important physicists are still missing the essential point of decoher-
ence as a consequence of the fundamental nonlocality of (pure) quantum states. Nonlocal phase relations may 
even define observable individual properties in microscopic systems (such as the total spin of two particles at 
different positions), but nonetheless contribute to the decoherence of their subsystems. – Historically, the term 
“decoherence” was first invented in the context of “decoherent histories” in about 1985, where it was postulated 
in order to justify “consistent histories” within a conventional probability interpretation, whereas my arguments 
of 1970 were derived from the assumption of universal unitarity in an attempt to resolve the measurement prob-
lem – not in order to tolerate it. Ironically, it is precisely decoherence as a consequence of universal unitarity that 
had led to the traditional prejudice that quantum theory does not apply to the macroscopic world.  
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The experimental confirmation of decoherence as a smooth (though very fast) dynam-
ical process4 clearly demonstrates that the concept of entanglement does apply beyond micro-
scopic systems. This unification of two apparently separate realms of physics (quantum and 
classical) was certainly the most important achievement of decoherence theory. While this 
process must remain uncontrollable in order to be irreversible (thus giving rise to the “real” 
rather than “virtual” appearance of its outcome), it has many obvious and important conse-
quences – including apparent quantum jumps and the classical appearance of the world (as 
consisting of particles and fields). So it explains why we seem to observe individual atoms as 
apparent particles in a Paul trap, or tracks in a Wilson chamber as apparent particle trajecto-
ries (both are correctly described in terms of narrow wave packets), and why one finds bound 
microscopic systems preferentially in their energy eigenstates.7,10 It also allows us to under-
stand the mysterious concept of “complementarity” simply by the different entanglement of 
microscopic objects with the environment, caused by different measurement instruments. This 
choice of “complementary measurement devices” is not available any more for systems, such 
as macroscopic ones, that are already strongly entangled with their unavoidable environment 
– without being measured by a physicist. The basis “preferred” by this unavoidable environ-
ment then defines a quasi-classical configuration space for such systems, which include even 
major parts of the thus partially classical observers (such as their neural system).  
Decoherence also explains Dirac’s famous remark that “a photon can only interfere 
with itself”. This statement appears surprising since all “photons” are excitations of one and 
the same quantum field (cf. Sects. 3 and 5), and are thus known to be indistinguishable. How-
ever, if two equal atoms at positions A and B, say, are initially in the same excited state, they 
may independently decay by emitting an outgoing radiation mode centered at their respective 
position. Since these two wave modes are then correlated with different (orthogonal) final 
states of their total source, they are decohered from one another, and so appear to represent 
“different photons”. If the excited atoms were replaced by lasers as radiation sources, these 
coherent states would not change when emitting a photon, and even the superposition of wave 
packets emitted by different lasers may interfere where and whenever they overlap; they rep-
resent “one and the same photon”. The relative phase between these two components may 
initially not be known, but evidently it exists and can be observed (cf. Footnote ‡). This su-
perposition of two photon components has to be distinguished from a “two-photon” state 
(double-decay), which has two nodes in its field functional, may be described by a symme-
trized product wave function, and will cause two clicks in the detector.   
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While virtual decoherence had always been known in the form of microscopic (re-
versible and often observable) entanglement, the unavoidable and irreversible consequence of 
the environment on macroscopic systems was overlooked for five decades, mainly because 
quantum mechanics was traditionally assumed not to apply beyond microscopic systems. Sur-
prisingly, the apparently reversible classical mechanics requires in unitary description the 
permanent (though mostly thermodynamically negligible) action of irreversible decoherence. 
In order to illustrate the enormous number of new parallel “worlds” that are perma-
nently created by means of decoherence (or would otherwise be permanently annihilated by a 
collapse mechanism), let me consider the example of a two-slit experiment. Measuring which 
slit the “particle” passes would double the number of worlds, but registration of the particle 
on the second screen causes a multiplication of worlds by a large factor that depends on the 
remaining coherence lengths for the positions of the decohered spots. (Everett “worlds” need 
not be exactly orthogonal, and thus cannot simply be counted; they may even form an over-
complete set.) This definition of branch worlds by their irreversible separation in configura-
tion space means also that quantum computers do not simultaneously calculate in parallel 
worlds (as sometimes claimed) if they are to produce a coherent result that may then be used 
in “our” world, for example; “real” (rather than virtual) branches can by definition not lead to 
observable (local) superpositions anymore.  
Most “particles” in the two-slit experiment do not even pass the slits, but may instead 
be absorbed on the first screen. This would correspond to a position measurement, too – re-
gardless of whether its information is ever extracted. In order to cause decoherence, this “in-
formation” may even be thermalized (erased in the usual sense). In contrast, a “quantum eras-
er” requires a local superposition to be restored, that is, re-localized, rather than information 
to be destroyed, as its name may suggest. Similar irreversible entanglement forms in all occa-
sional interactions between different quantum systems. For M such “measurement-like 
events” in the past history of the universe with, on average, N different outcomes, one would 
obtain the huge number of NM now existing branches. Nonetheless, the global configuration 
space remains almost empty because of its huge dimension; the myriads of branching wave 
packets that have ever been created by real decoherence describe autonomous “worlds” for all 
reasonable times to come. Nobody can calculate such a global wave function, of course, but 
under appropriate (far from equilibrium) initial conditions for the universe, its unitary dynam-
ics can be used consistently to justify (1) quasi-classical properties and behavior for all de-
grees of freedom that are “robust” under decoherence, (2) statistical methods (retarded proba-
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bilistic master equations) for most others,9 and (3) individual wave functions for appropriately 
prepared microscopic systems. In the case of controllable non-local entanglement, this latter 
kind of preparation can even be applied at a distance – a phenomenon known as “quantum 
steering”. These three dynamical applications are then also sufficient to describe measurement 
devices to begin with. No phenomenological concepts (such as particles, events, pointer posi-
tions, or even Alice and Bob) are required on a fundamental level. 
The observation of radioactive decay represents another measurement of a continuous 
variable (namely, the decay time). Its precision cannot be better than the remaining coherence 
time (which is usually very much smaller than the half-life, and thus gives rise to apparent 
quantum jumps). This coherence time depends on the efficiency of the interaction of the de-
cay fragments with their environment, and it would be further reduced by permanent registra-
tion of the (non-) decay. If an excited state decays only by emission of weakly interacting 
photons, however, decoherence may be relatively slow. In a cavity, one may then even ob-
serve a superposition of different decay times, thus definitely excluding genuine quantum 
jumps (“events”) in this case. There is no reason to believe that this would be different if the 
photon had travelled astronomical distances before such a coherent state vector revival occurs.  
 Many leading physicists who are not happy any more with the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion nonetheless prefer to speculate about some novel kind of dynamics (an as yet unknown 
collapse mechanism) that would avoid the consequence of Many Worlds. This is at present no 
more than prejudice or wishful thinking, but it could in principle also solve the measurement 
problem in terms of an ontic (in this case partially localized) universal wave function without 
requiring Everett’s splitting observers. One should keep in mind, though, that all as yet ob-
served apparent deviations from unitarity, such as quantum jumps or measurements, can be 
well described (and have in several cases been confirmed experimentally) as smooth decoher-
ence processes in accordance with a global Schrödinger equation. Therefore, if a genuine col-
lapse mechanism did exist after all, it would presumably have to be triggered by decoherence, 
but it could then hardly have any observable consequences on its own.  
  For example, if one of two spatially separated but entangled microscopic systems 
(such as those forming a “Bell state”) was measured, their total state would according to a 
unitary description become entangled with the apparatus, too, and thus also with the latter’s 
environment. While this process leads to the formation of two dynamically autonomous 
branches, an observer at the location of the second system, say, becomes part of this entan-
glement (and therefore “splits”) only when he receives a signal about the result. Before this 
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happens, his state factors out, and he may be said not yet to know the result. Since the local 
mixed state resulting from decoherence represents an apparent ensemble, this final step of an 
observation appears as a mere increase of information about an already existing property. If 
he also measured the second system (that at his own location in this example), the state of his 
memory must thereafter depend on the outcomes of both measurements, that is, it must have 
split twice unless there was an exact correlation between the results. Since the order of these 
two measurements does not matter, in general, this description includes delayed choice exper-
iments. In contrast, a genuine collapse caused by the measurement would have to affect dis-
tant objects instantaneously (whatever that means relativistically) in order to avoid other 
weird consequences. This would then define the “spooky” part of the story. 
An apparent ensemble of quasi-classical “worlds” is not exactly, but for all practical 
purposes (“FAPP”) sufficiently, defined by the autonomous branches of the wave function 
that arise from decoherence: a measurement cannot be undone in practice as soon as the glob-
al superposition cannot be re-localized any more. Reasonable observer states can then only 
evolve separately within the different branches. Neither can we as yet precisely define con-
scious observer systems in physical terms, nor would this definition completely explain 
Born’s rule: observers in many branches would, in series of measurements, even observe fre-
quencies of outcomes that are not in accord with Born’s rule. What we still need, therefore, is 
a probabilistic characterization of the quasi-classical world in which “we” happen to live.  
In all interpretations of quantum mechanics, Born’s rule had to be postulated (in addi-
tion to the unitary dynamics) on empirical grounds in some form. In the Everett interpretation, 
the situation is now partly solved by the unitary mechanism of decoherence, as the members 
of an effective ensemble of potential physical “outcomes” are sufficiently defined. In contrast 
to the splitting of subjective observers, this branching into autonomous “worlds” is not a new 
fundamental concept; it is a consequence of global unitary dynamics. According to their defi-
nition by robustness against further decoherence, there are no autonomous branches that con-
tain Schrödinger cats, sugar molecules in parity eigenstates, or other “macroscopic” superpo-
sitions. So their probability is zero. All we still have to postulate for the remaining branches 
are probability weights for subjective observers (us) to find ourselves existing in them. For 
these weights to be dynamically consistent, the squared norm (the formal measure of size of 
the branches) is the only reasonable candidate, since it is additive and conserved under unitary 
dynamics, and thus not affected by any subsequent finer branching. (For example, further 
branching occurs during subsequent physical information processing, such as photon “meas-
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urements” on the retina, or by measurement-type events somewhere else in the universe.) 
Therefore, these weights give rise to individual probabilities for apparent collapse events, and 
thus to the concept of “consistent histories”. Everett regarded this dynamical argument, which 
is similar to the choice of phase space volume in classical mechanics, as proof of Born’s 
probabilities.11 However, only after explicitly postulating them, does the density matrix 
(called a “mixed state”) become justified as a conceptual tool, as it allows us to calculate all 
“expectation values” according to these probabilities.  
 By consistently using this global unitary description, all those much discussed “ab-
surdities” of quantum theory can be explained. It is in fact precisely how they were all pre-
dicted – except that the chain of unitary interactions is usually cut off ad hoc by a collapse at 
the last relevant measurement in an experiment, where the corresponding decoherence defines 
a consistent position for the hypothetical Heisenberg cut. Therefore, all those “weird” quan-
tum phenomena observed during the last 80 years can only have surprised those who had nev-
er seriously considered the possibility of a universal validity of unitarity (including most of 
the founders of quantum theory). Absurdities, such as “interaction-free measurements”, arise 
instead if one assumes the quasi-classical phenomena (such as events) rather than the wave 
function as describing “reality”. If the wave function itself represents reality, however, any 
“post-selected” component would not describe the previously documented past any more, as it 
should be the case if this post-selection was no more than a “normal” increase of information.  
So-called quantum teleportation is another example where one can easily show, using 
unitary dynamics, that nothing is ever “teleported” that, or whose deterministic predecessor, 
was not prepared in advance at its intended position in one or more components of an entan-
gled initial wave function.10 This confirms again that entangled wave functions cannot merely 
represent a bookkeeping device – even though a local observer may pretend that an objective 
global collapse into a non-predictable branch had already occurred (or that the outcome had 
been created in some other kind of “event”) as a consequence of the first irreversible decoher-
ence process after a measurement. It is precisely this possibility that justifies the usual prag-
matic approach to quantum mechanics (including Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation or von 
Neumann’s collapse during a measurement). However, if one assumed only local properties, 
such as quasi-classical measurement outcomes, to describe reality, one would indeed have to 
believe in teleportation and other kinds of spooky action at a distance. According to the Ever-
ett interpretation, the usual restriction of “our” quantum world to a tiny and permanently fur-
ther collapsing effective wave function therefore represents no more than a pragmatic conven-
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tion that reflects the observer’s changing physical situation rather than a collapse process. 
Such a “collapse by convention” could even be assumed to apply instantaneously (super-
luminally), but it should be evident that a mere convention cannot be used for sending signals.  
 If the global state does indeed always obey unitary dynamics, the observed quantum 
indeterminism can clearly not represent any objective dynamical law. In the Everett interpre-
tation, it is in principle a “subjective” phenomenon that reflects the branching histories of all 
observers into many different versions (with their “many minds”). This may explain Heisen-
berg’s original interpretation of quantum measurements as requiring “human” observers. This 
passive indeterminism is nonetheless essential for the observed dynamics of the quantum 
world (some observers’ “relative state”). All measurement outcomes are objectivized by the 
correlation between those versions of different observers (including Wigner’s friend or Schrö-
dinger’s cat) who exist in the same Everett branch, and thus can communicate. For all practi-
cal purposes, their entanglement with the apparatus after reading it, and with the environment, 
also justifies Bohr’s interpretation of measurements (unlike Heisenberg’s) in terms of classi-
cal outcomes that would be irreversibly and objectively created (in apparent events) by the 
macroscopic apparatus. This macroscopic entanglement (in addition to decoherence) explains 
the traditional concept of a causal “classical reality”: only a documented phenomenon is a 
phenomenon (see also Footnote ** in Sect. 5). Only if one misinterpreted the resulting global 
superposition as a statistical ensemble with respect to an external observer, would an observa-
tion of the outcome appear as a mere increase of the latter’s information. 
 
5. Quantum Field Theory 
We have seen that quantum mechanics in terms of a universal wave function admits a con-
sistent (even though novel kind of) description of Nature, but this does not yet bring the 
strange story of particles and waves to an end. Instead of spatial waves (fields) we were led to 
wave functions on a high-dimensional “configuration space” (a name that is justified only by 
its appearance as a space of potential classical states because of decoherence). For a universe 
consisting of N particles, this configuration space would possess 3N dimensions, but we may 
conclude from the arguments presented in Sect. 3 that for QED (quantum electrodynamics) it 
must be supplemented by the infinite-dimensional configuration space of the Maxwell fields 
(or their vector potentials in the canonical formalism). A product of wave functions for the 
amplitudes of all field modes in a cavity or in free space turned out to be sufficient to explain 
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Planck’s quanta by the number of nodes of these oscillator wave functions. The spontaneous 
occurrence of photons as apparent particles (in the form of clicking counters, for example) is 
then merely a consequence of the fast decoherence caused by the macroscopic detector.  
 However, we know from the quantum theory of relativistic electrons that they, too, 
have to be described by a quantized field (that is, by a field functional) – a consequence that 
must remain true in the non-relativistic limit. There are then no particles even before quanti-
zation. The relativistic generalization of a one-electron wave function is called the Dirac field, 
since it is usually studied as a function on spacetime. Dirac proposed it successfully for the 
hydrogen atom at a time when Schrödinger’s wave function was still believed to define a spa-
tial field for each electron, but the Dirac field can not be generalized to an N-electron field on 
a 4N-dimensional “configuration spacetime”, although this has occasionally been proposed. 
There is only one time parameter describing the dynamics for the total state. In the Schrö-
dinger picture of QED, the Dirac field is used to define, by its configuration space and that of 
the Maxwell field, the space on which the corresponding time-dependent wave functionals 
live. According to the rules of canonical quantization, these wave functionals have to obey a 
generalized Schrödinger equation again (also called the Tomonaga equation).12   
Spin and other internal degrees of freedom thereby become part of the “classical” (not-
yet-quantized) spatial fields. While such position-dependent spinors then form a kind of 
“classical entanglement” between position and spin of one object, they do not imply any Bell 
type non-locality. For example, the dynamical separation of spatial wave packets correspond-
ing to different neutrino masses that contribute to their initial flavor while the neutrinos travel 
astronomical distances, has also been called “decoherence”. Since it may be regarded as the 
longitudinal version of a Stern-Gerlach (pre-) measurement of the spin by the position varia-
ble, this neutrino decoherence should also be called “virtual”, even though the neutrino wave 
packets can hardly ever be recombined in practice in order to restore the initial flavor. Real 
decoherence is usually defined as the uncontrollably arising entanglement with an unbounded 
number of unavoidable environmental degrees of freedom – cf. also footnotes in Sect. 4 – but 
this is a matter of definition. The recent detection of coherent neutrino scattering13 demon-
strates indeed that individual neutrinos have to be described by field modes (just as photons), 
while their apparent particle properties are again caused by genuine decoherence (an apparent 
collapse into a wave packet) in their detectors and (for neutrinos) also during their creation 
process (which gives rise to incoherent ensembles of radial wave packets or emission times).  
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Nonrelativistically, the formalism of QFT avoids an N-dependence of the required 
configuration spaces for different numbers N of “particles”. Quite generally, it allows for a 
concept of “particle creation”, such as by raising the number of nodes of the field functional 
(cf. Sect. 3). Relativistic covariance cannot and need not be manifest in the canonical formal-
ism. For example, the canonical quantization of the Maxwell field leads consistently to a 
wave functional Y{A(x);t}, with a vector field A defined at all space-points x on an arbitrary 
simultaneity t. Since Schrödinger had originally discovered his one-electron wave function by 
the same canonical quantization procedure (applied to a single mass point), the quantization 
of the Dirac field is for this purely historical reason also called a “second quantization”. As 
explained in Sect. 4, though, the particle concept, and with it the first quantization, are no 
more than historical artifacts.14 
Freeman Dyson’s “equivalence” of using relativistic field functionals (Tomonaga) or 
time-dependent field operators (Feynman)15 is essentially based on the limited equivalence 
between the Schrödinger and the Heisenberg picture. The latter would hardly be able even in 
principle to describe the hefty, steadily growing entanglement described by a time-dependent 
global wave functional. It is therefore mostly restricted to the quantization of free fields (cou-
pled oscillators, which can easily be quantized algebraically). Since relativity is incompatible 
with absolute simultaneities, the relativistic generalization of the Schrödinger equation can 
only be given by the Tomonaga equation with its “many-fingered” concept of time (arbitrary 
simultaneities). Apparent particle lines in Feynman diagrams, on the other hand, are merely 
shorthand for free field modes (such as plane waves, with “particle momenta” representing 
their wave numbers).3 These diagrams are used as intuitive tools to construct terms of a per-
turbation series described as integrals over products of such field modes and other factors – 
mainly for calculating scattering amplitudes. In this picture, closed lines (“virtual particles”) 
may represent local entanglement between quantum fields. Since high-energy physics is most-
ly restricted to scattering experiments, unitarity is in many textbooks quite insufficiently de-
fined by the conservation of probability – thus neglecting its essential consequence for the 
quantum phases, which are needed to determine nonlocal superpositions that must arise in 
such a scattering process. Neglecting them would presume a probabilistic collapse. 
 The Hamiltonian form of the Dirac field equation is unusual because of its lineariza-
tion in terms of particle momentum: the classical canonical momenta are not given by time 
derivatives of the position variables (velocities) any more. Nonetheless, the two occupation 
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numbers 0 and 1 resulting from the assumption of anti-commuting field operators§ are again 
interpreted as “particle” numbers because of their consequences in the quasi-classical world. 
Field modes “occupied” once in this sense and their superpositions define again “single-
particle wave functions”. In contrast to the case of photons, however, one never observes su-
perpositions (wave functionals) of different electron numbers. This has traditionally been re-
garded as a fundamental restriction of the superposition principle (an axiomatic “charge su-
perselection rule”), but it may be understood as another consequence of decoherence: for 
charged particles, their Coulomb field assumes the role of an environment.16 While there are 
proposals to explain discrete quantities, such as charge, as “winding numbers” for some field 
variables, this would not exclude their quantum superpositions. 
 In QFT, the formulation that one particle is in a quantum state described by the spatial 
wave function y1, and a second one in y2, is thus replaced by the statement that two field 
modes, y1 and y2, are both in their first excited quantum state (“occupied once”). A permuta-
tion of the two modes does not change this statement, which is based on a logical “and”. So 
there is only one state to be counted statistically. This eliminates Gibbs’ paradox in a very 
natural way. (Schrödinger seems to have used a similar argument in favor of waves instead of 
particles even before he explicitly formulated his wave equation.17) 
 It would similarly be inappropriate to claim that wave functions can be directly ob-
served in Bose-Einstein condensates (as is often done). What one does observe in this case are 
																																																								§	Let me emphasize, though, that the origin of the Pauli principle, which is valid for fermions, does not seem to 
be entirely understood yet. While the individual components of the Dirac spinor also obey the Klein-Gordon 
equation, the latter’s quantization as a field of coupled oscillators would again require all oscillator quantum 
numbers n = 0,1,2,… . Anti-commuting field operators, which lead to anti-symmetric multi-particle wave func-
tions under permutations, were postulated quite ad hoc by Jordan and Wigner, and initially appeared artificial 
even to Dirac. Interpreted rigorously, their underlying configuration space (defining a Hilbert space basis again) 
would consist of a spatial continuum of bits (“empty” or “occupied”) rather than a continuum of coupled oscilla-
tors. The n-th excited state of this bit continuum (that is, n occupied positions) represents n identical point-like 
“objects”. Because of the dynamical coupling between bit-neighbors, these objects can move, but only after their 
quantization, which leads to entangled superpositions of different occupied space points, may they give rise to 
propagating waves. In order to be compatible with this bit continuum, the coefficients of these superpositions 
(“multi-fermion wave functions”) must vanish whenever two of their arguments coincide. This can quite general-
ly be achieved by assuming them to be antisymmetric under permutations of any two arguments. No field alge-
bra is explicitly required for this argument (although it could then be consistently defined). In this picture, single-
fermion wave functions would represent genuine quantum states (quantum superpositions) rather than wave 
modes as for bosons. In contrast, coupled oscillators defining a free boson field propagate as spatial waves, and 
thus obey a classical superposition principle (in space rather than in their configuration space) in addition to the 
quantum superposition principle that is realized for them by the field functionals. This difference would be par-
ticularly dramatic in Bohm’s theory, where one often meets disagreement on whether its trajectories have to 
include photons as particles or as a time-dependent vector potential (a classical field). However, these pre-quant-
ization concepts need not possess any physical meaning by themselves. Moreover, such a fundamental distinc-
tion between bosons and fermions may be problematic for composite “particles” (dressed fields). 
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again the (now many times “occupied”) three-dimensional boson field modes. This includes 
massive bosons, which are traditionally regarded as particles. Instead of the free field modes 
used for photons, however, interacting bosons are then more appropriately described in terms 
of self-consistent field modes, similar to the self-consistent Hartree-Fock single-fermion wave 
functions. Both methods neglect any “particle” entanglement, and can therefore at most repre-
sent approximations for the lowest states. They lead to what is regarded as an effective non-
linear “single-particle wave equation” – for bosons called the Gross-Pitaevskii equation.** In 
spite of this effective non-linearity, the quantum states proper are, of course, still described by 
the linear Schrödinger equation – relativistically always in the sense of Tomonaga.12  
As already mentioned in Sect. 3, photon number eigenfunctions y(n)(q) in the configu-
ration space of wave amplitudes q – to be distinguished from their three-dimensional field 
modes (“single-photon wave functions”, which are fixed modes in a cavity in this case) – 
have recently been observed by means of their Wigner functions, and thus confirmed to exist, 
for various values of the “particle number” n.4 For pure states, Wigner functions are defined 
as partial Fourier transforms of the dyadic products y(n)(q)y(n)*(q’), and thus equivalent to the 
wave functions y(n)(q) themselves (except for a total phase). The variable q is here the ampli-
tude of the given field mode rather than some spatial position as in single-particle quantum 
mechanics. The two-dimensional Wigner functions on their apparent phase space q,p were 
made visible in this experiment, and so allow one to clearly recognize the n nodes of the wave 																																																								**	At higher temperatures, “many-particle” systems (that is, multiple quantum field exitations) may behave ap-
proximately like a gas of classical particles undergoing stochastic collisions because of the mutual decoherence 
of the field modes into apparent ensembles of narrow spatial wave packets.29 This consequence perfectly justifies 
Boltzmann’s Stosszahlansatz – but not any quasi-deterministic particle trajectories. The concept of trajectories 
would approximately apply only to heavy objects that suffer mainly “pure” decoherence (with negligible recoil). 
“Open” quantum systems are generally described by similar phenomenological (Lindblad-type) master equations 
that are often postulated rather than being derived from realistic assumptions for a quantum environment, and 
then easily misunderstood as representing fundamental deviations from unitary quantum mechanics. In order to 
be regarded as “macroscopic” (in the sense of not being part of a thermal distribution), quasi-classical (deco-
hered) variables have furthermore to be redundantly documented in the rest of the universe – see under “fork of 
causality”, “consistency of documents”, or “overdetermination of the past” in the first Ref. 7, for example in 
Footnote 1 on its page 18. Dynamically conserved information about such systems may nonetheless be dynami-
cally exchanged between microscopic and macroscopic variables, that is, between negentropy and macroscopic 
information proper. In many situations this distinction is not very clearly defined. – In the theory of “quantum 
Darwinism”,30 these classical thermodynamic arguments are combined (and perhaps a bit confused) with the 
quantum concept of decoherence, which represents spreading physical entanglement, but not necessarily any 
spreading of (usable) information into the environment. Creation of (necessarily physical) information about a 
system must always lead to its decoherence, while the opposite is not true: even an environment in thermal equi-
librium may allow further entanglement with a “system under consideration” to form. Documents which define 
humanistic history – including the history of science – obviously require even more specific correlations (which 
define a specific “context”). 
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functions y(n)(q) (forming circles in phase space). Creation and annihilation operators are de-
fined to change the number of these nodes. Since these operators occur dynamically only in 
the Schrödinger equation, they describe smooth physical processes (time-dependent wave 
functionals), while creation “events” are either meant just conceptually, or would require a 
fast decoherence process. The physical nature of field functionals is also confirmed by their 
ability to participate in the general entanglement of interacting systems and, in this way, con-
tribute to the observable decoherence of the states of radiation sources without having to af-
fect any “real” absorbing matter (thus also excluding any action at a distance in this case). 
 For relativistic reasons, all known elementary physical objects are described as quan-
tum fields (although they are usually called “elementary particles”). The contrast between the 
first order in time of the Schrödinger equation and the second order of classical field equa-
tions with their negative frequencies opens the door to the concept of “anti-bosons”. (For fer-
mions this relation assumes a different form – depending on the starting point before quanti-
zation, as indicated in Footnote §.) Because of the universality of quantum fields, one may 
also expect a “theory of everything” to exist in the form of a unified quantum field theory. At 
present, though, the assumption that the fundamental arena for the universal wave function be 
given by the configuration space of some fundamental field(s) is no more than the most plau-
sible attempt. On the other hand, the general framework of Schrödinger’s wave function(al) or 
Dirac’s superposition principle as a universal concept for quantum states has always been 
confirmed, while attempts to derive this framework from some deeper (“hidden”) level have 
failed and are strongly restricted by various no-go theorems. Therefore, an epistemic interpre-
tation of pure quantum states seems to be ruled out.  
 Among boson fields, gauge fields play a surprisingly physical role, since gauge trans-
formations appear locally as unphysical redundancies. Their physical role is facilitated by 
their dynamical entanglement, which thus reveals that the redundancy holds only classically, 
where gauge variables appear as purely relational quantities.18 An important question after 
quantization is whether gauge symmetries can be broken by a real or apparent collapse.  
Unfortunately, interacting fields require the entanglement of such an enormous num-
ber of fundamental degrees of freedom – traditionally interpreted as “quantum fluctuations” 
even in time-independent states – that they cannot even approximately be treated beyond a 
questionable (though within its applicability very successful) perturbation theory in terms of 
free effective fields. This limitation to the quantization of coupled oscillators may also explain 
why the Heisenberg picture appears sufficient for QFT. Instead of consistently applying the 
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established concepts from quantum mechanics (general superpositions) to the new variables 
(field amplitudes) in the form of time-dependent general field functionals, various semi-
phenomenological concepts are therefore used for specific purposes – mostly for calculating 
scattering amplitudes between phenomenologically chosen objects that are treated as being 
asymptotically free. (This can be approximately valid only in exceptional situations, such as 
high energy laboratory experiments.) The applicability of the S-matrix must be quite limited, 
in general, since unitary dynamics is a continuous process rather than a succession of scatter-
ing events in space. It may reflect (but can hardly explain) properties of the “objects” to which 
it applies. Apparent particle properties of such asymptotic (“on shell”) objects, such as their 
momenta, are again regarded as “real” rather than “virtual” as soon as their superpositions 
have irreversibly become irrelevant for local observers. 
Stable local entanglement between different fields may be regarded as their “dressing” 
(similar to the entanglement between proton and electron in the bound hydrogen atom – cf. 
Sect. 4), while chaotic nonlocal entanglement must describe decoherence, and may thus lead 
to the appearance of scattering as a probabilistic rather than a unitary process. For individual 
field modes, such as in cavity QED, one may explicitly study their entanglement, for example 
that with individual atoms. 
 Similar semi-phenomenological methods as in QFT are also used in condensed matter 
physics, even when its objects of interest are non-relativistically regarded as given N-particle 
systems. They may nonetheless give rise to effective phonon fields or various kinds of “quasi-
particles”. The wave function for the lattice ions and their electrons, for example, is here re-
garded as fundamental, while the phonon field functional “emerges” – similar to Goldstone 
bosons in QFT. Symmetry-breaking effective ground states (such as lattices with fixed posi-
tions and orientations) and their corresponding “Fock spaces” can be understood as represent-
ing Everett branches that have become autonomous by the decoherence of their superpositions 
into wave packets during a condensation process.19 Some “Fock vacua” are characterized by 
the number of certain particles (such as electrons in a metal) that form a stable entanglement 
in this ground state. Most familiar are pair correlations in the BCS model of superconductivi-
ty. A similar model in QFT led to the prediction of the Higgs “particle”. However, only in 
situations described by an effective Hamiltonian that gives rise to an energy gap (defining an 
effective mass) can the lowest excited states approximately avoid further decoherence within 
their corresponding Fock space under normal conditions and low temperatures, and thus ex-
hibit the usual phenomena of “single particle” quantum mechanics.  
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The BCS (pair correlation) model is also useful for understanding the meaning of 
Hawking or Unruh radiation,20 which is often misinterpreted as resulting from vacuum fluctu-
ations rather than entanglement. Since only exceptional field modes of a given space volume 
would obey the boundary conditions also for certain subvolumes, not even the total vacuum 
factorizes into local subvacua for the quantum field. The Hilbert space Hamiltonian, there-
fore, depends not only on the differential operators, but also on the chosen boundary condi-
tions (in order to define its eigenstates), while complementary subvolumes are entangled with 
one another in almost all pure states of the total volume. For parallel pairs of physical bounda-
ries (conducting plates), which require an infinite energy renormalization corresponding to the 
zero-point energies of all thereby excluded field modes, this leads to the Casimir effect as a 
measurable (finite) dependence on the distance between the plates. In the absence of physical 
boundaries, the entanglement between subvolumes may be regarded as a mutual decoherence. 
Non-inertial detectors, for example, define effective spacetime horizons as formal boundaries 
for the modes to which they couple, and thus register a thermal mixture representing Hawking 
or Unruh radiation in the inertial vacuum (which extends beyond these horizons). This radia-
tion does not require any stochastic “particle creation” – there would only be stochastic regis-
tration of apparent particles by means of decoherence in accelerated detectors. Without this 
decoherence, a black hole would define a coherent outgoing Hawking flux, for example. The 
presence of particles is thus a matter of “spacetime perspective”, based on the choice of non-
inertial reference frames (such as Rindler frames) that are used to define their specific “plane” 
wave modes, while the abstract quantum field states, such as different “physical vacua”, rep-
resent “real” states in spite of their ambiguous interpretation in terms of particles.  
Within microscopic many-particle systems, for example in small molecules or atomic 
nuclei, spontaneous symmetry breaking may even lead to energy eigenstates for collective 
motions (such as rotations or vibrations) rather than to a real asymmetry. Since electrically 
neutral microscopic objects can often be assumed to be isolated from their environments, 
asymmetric “model ground states” (deformed nuclei or asymmetric, such as chiral, molecular 
configurations – similar to Fock vacua in solid states) are degenerate, and thus lead to energy 
bands or multiplets by means of different superpositions of all their degenerate orientations or 
chiralities.21 The corresponding collective degrees of freedom are often classically visualized 
as describing slow (“adiabatic”) motion, although classical motion would in turn require time-
dependent superpositions of different energy eigenstates. The quantum mechanical justifica-
tion of such time-dependent states, which are found for macroscopic objects, had to await the 
discovery of decoherence (here of the energy eigenstates). Since all particles in a collective 
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superposition of different orientations are strongly entangled with one another, energy eigen-
states are analogous to the bird’s perspective of a quantum world, while an external observer 
of such an eigenstate assumes the role of a “real bird”. In contrast, the whole quantum world 
must contain, and thus be entangled with, its observer, who thus gives rise to “many minds” 
with their asymmetric frog’s perspectives (broken symmetries – cf. Sect. 4).19 In accordance 
with this picture, individual particles that are part of collective rotational superpositions feel 
in first approximation only a fixed deformed potential (analogous to observing a definite 
measurement outcome!), as can be seen from their single-particle spectra – for example Niel-
son states in deformed nuclei as a variant of the nuclear shell model. (This observation origi-
nally suggested the many-minds interpretation.) In this sense, collective superpositions imitate 
a “multiverse” consisting of different orientations, although such quantum cosmological anal-
ogies may have delayed the acceptance of the concept of decoherence for a decade, until its 
“naïve” interpretation by means of the pragmatically justified reduced density matrix formal-
ism became popular and made it acceptable to many practicing quantum physicists. In the 
case of a global symmetry, collective variables bear some similarity to gauge variables.  
On a very elementary level, semi-phenomenological methods were already used for 
the hydrogen molecule by separately quantizing its “effective” degrees of freedom (center of 
mass motion, vibration, rotation and two independent electrons in the Coulomb field of adia-
batically moving nuclei) rather than treating it exactly as an entangled four-body problem. 
Chiral molecules can at very low energies effectively be described as two-state systems, while 
an analogous explanation may conceivably await discovery for all kinds of qubits. 
In QFT, the successful phenomenology of apparently fundamental fields (“elementary 
particles”), such as described by the Standard Model, has to be expected to form the major 
touchstone for any fundamental theory of the future. This may be true even though quantum 
chromodynamics seems to be already too complex for us to derive nuclear physics phenome-
na without auxiliary assumptions. This Standard Model is essentially based on linear repre-
sentations of some abstract symmetry groups, whose meaning is not yet understood. The 
physical importance of linear representations of groups for isolated systems is just another 
consequence of the superposition principle. At present, however, the Standard Model does not 
seem to offer any convincing hints for the nature of the elusive fundamental theory. 
All one may thus dare to predict is that the fundamental Hilbert space must possess a 
local basis (such as the configuration space of spatial fields and/or point-like objects) in order 
to allow for a definition of dynamical locality or “relativistic causality”. In contrast to popular 
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concepts of mono-causality, classical reality is multi-causal: in order to determine the fields at 
some spacetime point, one has to know them on a complete slice through its (past or future) 
light cone. Only because the causal connection between two events may then be difficult to 
recognize in general, did Einstein postulate the travel of “signals”, which may be character-
ized by some identifyable structure, rather than general causal influences to be limited by the 
speed of light. Although quantum superpositions of such fields are kinematically nonlocal, 
and thus able to violate Bell’s inequality, the dynamical locality defined for their basis re-
mains valid and important for them (including interactions that describe measurements and 
decoherence). This relativistic causality may even prevent the formation of black hole hori-
zons if it applies to Hawking radiation.22 While nonlocal phase relations defining superposi-
tions are essential for the precise value of von Neumann’s conserved global ensemble entropy 
(zero for pure states), the dynamical transformation of information about local systems into 
that about nonlocal correlations or entanglement describes the increase of “physical entropy”, 
since the latter is defined as additive and thus neglects nonlocal correlations for being ther-
modynamically “irrelevant”.9 
This search for the Hilbert space basis of a fundamental theory has nothing to do with 
that for “hidden variables”, which are to explain quantum indeterminism and the wave func-
tion themselves. All novel theories that are solely based on mathematical arguments, howev-
er, have to be regarded as speculative until empirically confirmed – and even as incomplete as 
long as there is no general consensus about the correct interpretation of their quantization. 
Many quantum field theorists and mathematical physicists seem to regard their semi-pheno-
menological models, combined with certain methods of calculation and applied to classical 
field or particle concepts, as the quantum field theory proper. Indeed, why should one expect 
a conceptually consistent theory if there is no microscopic reality to be described – as as-
sumed in the still popular Copenhagen interpretation and its variants? Therefore, most text-
books of QFT do not even attempt to present a consistent fundamental theory.  
Our conclusion that the observed particle aspect is merely the consequence of fast 
decoherence processes in the detecting media does not seem to be of particular interest to 
many high-energy physicists, although such phenomena in their detectors are an essential part 
of their experiments. So some of them call the enigmatic objects of their research “wavicles”, 
as they cannot make up their mind between particles and waves. This indifferent language 
represents another example of Wigner’s “Balkanization of physics” (or “many words instead 
of many worlds” according to Max Tegmark). The wave-particle “dualism” is usually still 
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understood in terms of spatial waves rather than wave functions in configuration space, alt-
hough the former should by now be known to be quite insufficient in quantum theory. 
 
6. Quantum Gravity and Quantum Cosmology 
I cannot finish a presentation of universal quantum theory without having mentioned quantum 
gravity. In their linear approximation, Einstein’s field equations for the metric tensor define 
separately oscillating spatial tensor modes, that after quantization give again rise to energy 
quanta hn (“gravitons”) – cf. Sect. 3. For consistency, however, the full theory has to be quan-
tized. Its dynamical variables must then appear among the arguments of a universal wave 
function, and thus be entangled with all others – in a very important way, as it turns out.23  
 The Hamiltonian formalism of Einstein’s nonlinear field equations, required for their 
“canonical” quantization, was brought into a very plausible form by Arnowitt, Deser and 
Misner in 1962. They demonstrated that the configuration space of gravity can be understood 
as consisting of the spatial geometries of all possible three-dimensional space-like hypersur-
faces in spacetime. These hypersurfaces define arbitrary simultaneities that may form various 
foliations of spacetime, which may then be parametrized by a time coordinate t. This Hamil-
tonian form of the theory is therefore also called “geometrodynamics”. Its canonical quantiza-
tion leads to a (somewhat ambiguously defined) Schrödinger equation in the sense of Tomon-
aga for the wave functional on all these geometries – known as the Wheeler-DeWitt equation. 
This is another example demonstrating that the Hamiltonian form of a theory is not in conflict 
with its relativistic nature. 
 In contrast to the normal Schrödinger equation, the WDW equation remarkably as-
sumes the form HY = 0. This can also be understood as a constraint, while the Schrödinger 
equation itself then becomes trivial: ∂Y/∂t = 0. The reason is that there is no classical 
spacetime any more to be foliated. (Each foliation would correspond to a trajectory through 
this configuration space – in conflict with quantum concepts). However, the spatial metric 
that occurs (besides matter variables) as an argument of the wave functional Y would deter-
mine all proper times (defining clock times) along time-like curves which connect it classical-
ly, that is, according to the Einstein equations, with any other given spatial geometry – regard-
less of the choice of a foliation. Therefore, in spite of its formal timelessness, the Wheeler-
DeWitt equation does define a physical time dependence by means of the entanglement be-
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tween all its variables – similar to the entanglement y(u,q) between a quantum clock u and 
other variables q instead of a time dependence q(u). Therefore, the formal timelessness of the 
WDW equation is a genuine quantum property, as it reflects the absence of trajectories. Al-
though classical spacetimes can be represented by trajectories that can be parametrizied by 
one coordinate time t (invariantly reparametrizable by monotoneous functions t’(t)), dynam-
ical time is in general many-fingered, that is, it depends on the local progression of the space-
like hypersurfaces independently at any space point. In the case of an exactly homogenous 
and isotropic Friedmann cosmology, it may be represented by one single “finger”: the expan-
sion parameter a. If the wave function were regarded as a probability amplitude, it would now 
define probabilities for physical time; it is not a function of (some external) time any more.  
 It is further remarkable in this connection that, for Friedmann type universes, the 
Hamiltonian constraint HY = 0 assumes a hyperbolic form in its infinite-dimensional (gauge-
free) configuration space – again with a or its logarithm defining a time-like variable. This 
property is physically quite important, as it allows for a global “initial” value problem for the 
wave functional – for example at a ® 0.24 For increasing a, its solution may form a superposi-
tion of wave packets that “move” through this configuration space as a function of a. A dras-
tic asymmetry of Y with respect to a reversal of a (an “intrinsic” arrow of time) might then be 
derivable even from symmetric boundary conditions (such as the usual integrability condition 
in a) because of the asymmetry of the Hamiltonian under this physical reversal.  
Claus Kiefer could furthermore derive the time-dependent Schrödinger (Tomonaga) 
equation for the matter wave function under a short wave length approximation for the geo-
metric degrees of freedom. It corresponds to a Born-Oppenheimer approximation with respect 
to the inverse Planck mass (see Kiefer’s Ch. 4 in Joos et al. of Ref. 7, or his Sect. 5.4 of Ref. 
23). This result demonstrates that the Wheeler-DeWitt equation can only describe a whole 
Everett multiverse, since each trajectory in the configuration space of spatial geometries may 
define its own classical spacetime. Narrow wave packets for the spatial geometry approxi-
mately propagating along such trajectories are decohered from one another by the matter vari-
ables (which thereby serve as an “environment”). This is analogous to the decoherence of 
atomic nuclei in large molecules by collisions with external particles – the reason why they 
appear to move on quasi-classical trajectories according to the frog’s perspective of a human 
observer. In cosmology, decoherence (that is, uncontrollable entanglement rather than the of-
ten mentioned “quantum fluctuations”) is also important for the origin of “classical” structure 
in the early universe during the onset of inflation.25 
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 If one also allows for “landscapes” (Tegmark’s Level 2 of multiverses26), which are 
assumed to exist in several hypothetical cosmologies that lead to a drastically inhomogeneous 
universe on the very large scale, the “selection” (by chance – not by free will) of a subjective 
observer with his epistemologically important frog’s perspective (cf. Sect. 4) may be roughly 
characterized by a hierarchy of five not necessarily independent steps: (1) the selection (in the 
sense of Everett or Tegmark’s Level 3 – usually regarded as a quantum measurement) of an 
individual landscape from their superposition that must be part of a global quantum state, (2) 
the selection of a particular region in this three or higher dimensional landscape (a causally 
separate “world” that may even be characterized by specific values of certain “constants of 
nature” – Level 2), (3) the selection of a quasi-classical spacetime from the Wheeler-DeWitt 
wave function by means of decoherence as indicated above (Level 3 again), (4) the selection 
of one individual complex organism from all those that may exist in this “world”, including 
some “moment of awareness” for it (giving rise to an approximate localization of this observ-
er in space and time: a subjective “here-and-now” – thus including Tegmark’s Level 1), and 
(5) the selection of one of his/her/its “versions” that must have been created by further Everett 
branching based on the decoherence of matter variables according to Sect. 4 (Level 3). There-
fore, every conceivable subjective observer who is part of the universe requires an extreme 
“individualization” (multifold localization) in the complete quantum world, and hence of his 
“Everett world” (his frog’s perspective). It seems to be required in order to define appropriate 
IISs (integrated-information systems), IGUSs (information gaining and utilizing systems), or 
whatever you call such parts of the universal wave function that may form the physical basis 
for conscious beings, and, therefore, for an observable universe. New physical laws may not 
be required for this purpose. 
 Each of these probabilistic steps may create its own unpredictable initial conditions 
characterizing the further evolution of the resulting individual “worlds”. Most properties 
characterizing our observed one can thus not be derived from any physical theory; they have 
to be empirically determined as part of an answer to the question: Where do we happen to live 
in objective “configuration” space? This unpredictability, including that of certain “constants 
of nature”, is by no means specific for a multiverse (as some critics of this concept argue). It 
would similarly apply to any kind of stochastic dynamics (such as collapse theories), or 
whenever statistical fluctuations are relevant during the early cosmic evolution. Only step 4 
can not be objectivized in the usual sense, namely with respect to different observers in the 
same quasi-classical world. Some of these steps may require an application of the weak an-
thropic principle in some sense (although I would not recommend to rely on it by playing 
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“Russian quantum roulette”!). Although each individual outcome can only have very small 
probability because of their large number, the actually observed ones should not be excep-
tionally improbable among them. This is still a strong condition, which may suffice to explain 
why observed frequencies of measurement results are in accord with Born’s rule (Sect. 4). 
Entropy may decrease during most of these steps (depending on its precise definition).6,9,27  
Let me add for completeness that Tegmark’s Level 1 and 2 multiverses are classical 
concepts, and thus unrelated to Everett’s branches, as they merely refer to separate regions in 
conventional space rather than branches in “configuration” space. It appears somewhat pre-
tentious here to speak of “parallel worlds” or “multiverses”; these names were originally in-
vented for Everett branches, and are here simply misused. This may perhaps be explained by 
the fact that many cosmologists had never accepted the role of entangled superpositions as 
part of quantum reality, and therefore prefer to replace them explicitly or tacitly by statistical 
correlations characterizing a collapse mechanism, for example. In this case, different out-
comes could be realized only at different places in a spatially sufficiently large universe, 
while – in contrast – different Everett “worlds” exist (in “configuration” space) even for a 
closed universe of traditional size. (However, even different kinds and sizes of universes may 
formally exist in one superposition if the superposition principle holds for them, too.)  
While landscapes with regions of different fundamental properties would be quite 
plausible in a spatially unbounded or very large universe without making use of Everett (simi-
lar to locally varying order parameters resulting from symmetry breaking phase transitions in 
solid state physics19), almost identical local situations occurring by chance somewhere in an 
infinite quasi-homogeneous world (Level 1) may be regarded as something between trivial 
(entirely irrelevant for us) and ill-defined. Although the double exponentials which are re-
quired to describe the expected distances from such statistical Doppelgängers can easily be 
formulated, an extrapolation of observed properties (such as an approximately flat quasi-
classical space) from the observable universe with its size of 1010 ly to something like  ly 
appears at least risky. Statistical estimates of probabilities would in any case apply only to 
chance fluctuations (such as “Boltzmann brains”), but not to situations resulting from evolu-
tion. If their probabilities, are calculated by means of some physical (that is, additive) entropy, 
they would completely neglect the existence of “consistent documents” (often regarded as an 
“overdetermination of the past” – see Footnote ** above and Sect. 3.5 of the first Ref. 9), 
while unstructured initial conditions (such as the initial homogeneity of a gravitating uni-
verse) represent even lower entropy values – in spite of their “plausibility”. 
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The role of Tegmark’s (as yet unmentioned) Level 4 universes is entirely questionable, 
since mathematics, while providing extremely useful conceptual tools for physics because of 
its analytical (tautological) nature and, therefore, the undeniable formal truth of its theorems, 
cannot by itself warrant the applicability of its formal concepts to the empirical world. Only 
if, and insofar as, such kinematical concepts have been empirically verified to be consistently 
applicable in a certain context, can we consider them as candidates for a description of “reali-
ty”. (This seems to be a point that many mathematicians working in theoretical physics and 
cosmology have problems to understand, since they are used to defining their concepts just 
for convenience.) Different mathematical frameworks can therefore not be regarded as indi-
cating the existence of corresponding different physical “worlds” or different parts of one 
multiworld. While Everett’s “many worlds” (just as all scientific cosmology) result from hy-
pothetical extrapolation of the observed world by means of empirical laws, there are no rea-
sons supporting the physical existence of Level 4 worlds. The mathematical concept of “ex-
istence”, for example, means no more than the absence of logical inconsistencies, that is, a 
necessary (hence important28) but not a sufficient condition for being “realized” in Nature. 
 
7. Conclusions  
These remarks about quantum gravity and quantum cosmology may bring the strange story of 
particles and waves to a preliminary end. While the particle concept was recognized as a delu-
sion, the observed wave aspects of microscopic objects can be understood only as part of a 
universal wave function in a very-high-dimensional (if not infinite-dimensional) “configura-
tion” space. If this wave function describes reality completely, no local properties can generi-
cally “exist” (although they may be observed). Only if one insisted that reality must be de-
fined in space and time would this very concept of reality (which is essentially equivalent to 
the existence of a consistent description of Nature) have to be abandoned. In spite of Bell’s 
theorem, the prejudice that reality has to be kinematically local still seems to represent the 
major hurdle for many physicists to accept a universal wave function as a physical object.  
The observable quantum world that defines our frog’s perspective (that is, the objecti-
vized relative state with respect to “individual minds” – see Sect. 4) is thus no more than a 
tiny component of this global wave function. The latter, representing the “bird’s view”, may 
be regarded as the true hidden reality behind the phenomena, since it is required from the ob-
server’s point of view only for reasons of dynamical consistency. This may appear similar to 
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the assumed reality of spacetime in classical GR in spite of the specific reference frames to 
which observers are bound. Ongoing branching of the relative state into autonomous sub-
branches of the wave function by means of decoherence then mimics a collapse process, and 
in this way solves the measurement problem in terms of many (branching) minds. The full 
Wheeler-DeWitt wave function, for example, seems to be meaningful only from the bird’s 
perspective (see Sect. 6). 
  
Fig. 2: A frog’s bird’s perspective 
Matrix mechanics with its formal concept of “observables” thus turns out to be only an 
effective probabilistic description in terms of not consistently applicable (hence mutually 
“complementary”) particle or other traditional concepts, which may in certain situations ap-
proximately apply to the observed world (our branch). Nonetheless, many physicists are still 
busy constructing absurdities, paradoxes, or no-go theorems in terms of such traditional con-
cepts in order to demonstrate the “weirdness” of quantum theory. This includes the infamous 
“information loss paradox” for black holes, which are predicted to disappear by means of 
Hawking radiation (a quantum phenomenon), but are also assumed to possess a classical 
event horizon of some kind.22 Even Alice and Bob are classical concepts that have to be justi-
fied by means of decoherence, that is, nonlocal entanglement with their environment. “Quan-
tum Bayesianism”, presently much en vogue, replaces the whole physical world by a black 
box, representing an abstract concept of “information” about inconsistent classical variables, 
and assumed to be available to vaguely defined “agents” rather than to observers who may be 
consistent parts of the physical world to be described. In contrast to Everett’s Many Worlds, 
for example, such a “non-theory” can never be falsified (it is “not even wrong”).  
While effective concepts like particles and spatial fields remain important for our eve-
ry-day life, including that in physics laboratories, their limited validity must deeply affect a 
consistent world model (cosmology, in particular). It is always amazing to observe how the 
love affair of mathematical physicists and general relativists with their various classical field 
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theories often prevents them from accepting, or even from sufficiently understanding, non-
local quantum states that are well-known from elementary quantum mechanics. Quantum ef-
fects are then often belittled as mere “anomalies” of their theories. Some mathematical physi-
cists are even trying to “explain” non-local quantum entanglement by means of speculative 
“worm holes” in space – apparently an attempt to save their belief in some local reality.  
We have to accept, however, that the precise structure of a local Hilbert space basis, 
which is often assumed to be given by the configuration space of some fundamental fields, 
remains elusive. Because of the unavoidable entanglement of all variables, one cannot expect 
the effective quantum fields, which are said to describe “elementary particles”, to be related to 
these elusive fundamental variables in a simple way. This conclusion puts in doubt much of 
the traditional approach to QFT, which is based on concepts of renormalization and “dress-
ing”. There are indeed excellent arguments why even emergent (“effective”) or quasi-classical 
fields may be mathematically elegant – thus giving rise to the impression of their fundamental 
nature. Novel mathematical concepts might nonetheless be required for finding the elusive 
ultimate theory, but their applicability to physics would have to be demonstrated empirically, 
and can thus never be confirmed to be exactly valid. This may severely limit the physical val-
ue of many “abstract” (non-intuitive) mathematical theorems. Just think of Einstein’s words 
“Insofern sich die Sätze der Mathematik auf die Wirklichkeit beziehen, sind sie nicht sicher, 
und insofern sie sicher sind, beziehen sie sich nicht auf die Wirklichkeit“, or Feynman’s re-
mark regarding early attempts to quantize gravity:3 “Don’t be so rigorous or you will not suc-
ceed.” Fundamental physical laws and concepts have so far mostly turned out to be mathe-
matically relatively simple, while their applications may be highly complex. This fact may 
explain why mathematicians have dominated theoretical physics mostly after completion of a 
new fundamental theory (such as Newton’s and even more so Einstein’s – but not yet for 
quantum theory!), or at times of stagnation, when mere reformulations or unconfirmed formal 
speculations (such as strings at the time of this writing) are often celebrated as new physics.  
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